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ABSTRACT 
Welfare states’ redistribution of resources across classes, occupations, and genders is the subject of inten-
sive scholarly analysis.  Yet we know very little about how and why welfare states treat different age 
groups differently.  This article demonstrates that seniors’ demand for welfare does not determine age-
orientation.  Rather, the “age of welfare” is a largely unintended consequence of the interaction between the 
structure of social policies and the way that politicians use these programs to compete for votes.  An impli-
cation for the policy feedback literature is that constituency demand may be less important than the unin-
tended consequences of welfare state institutions. 
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The capacity of welfare states to redistribute resources across classes, occupational 
groups, and even genders has been the subject of intensive analysis in political science and sociol-
ogy. Yet existing scholarship tells us very little about how and why welfare states treat different 
age groups differently, a dimension that crosscuts existing welfare-state typologies. This imbal-
ance persists despite the profound implications of the age-orientation of welfare states for both 
individual well-being and political economic adaptation to changing demographics and labor 
markets. Political scientists and economists who do attend to the age-orientation of welfare states 
have focused on the numerical and political dominance of senior citizens to explain why some 
countries spend more on the elderly than on other age groups. This article demonstrates that 
seniors’ demand for welfare does not determine age-orientation. Rather, the “age of welfare” is a 
largely unintended consequence of the interaction between early decisions about the structure of 
social policies and the way that politicians use these programs to compete for votes. 
 
Early choices about program design are important because welfare states in which eligi-
bility for benefits is based on citizenship mature over the course of the twentieth century into 
rather youth-oriented welfare states, while those that grant benefits linked to labor-market partici-
pation end up devoting the lion’s share of resources to the elderly. Where politicians compete for 
votes in a programmatic manner, citizenship-based entitlements are easier to put in place and eas-
ier to maintain, and welfare states are more youth-oriented. By contrast, patronage-oriented be-
havior by politicians locks into place occupationally-based social programs that result in elderly-
oriented social spending. The structure of social programs and the dominant mode of political 
competition in a polity reinforce each other, locking in early choices that produce unintended 
consequences quite unrelated to current configurations of political power or ideological domi-
nance. 
 
Why study the age-orientation of welfare states? Across the industrialized countries, the 
generosity and scope of social programs like public pensions, family allowances and benefits for 
the unemployed vary significantly, with consequences for the well-being of different age groups 
in the population.
2 It is worth understanding how welfare states treat different age groups be-
cause, quite apart from any normative concerns that we might have about intergenerational jus-
tice, it matters in the decisions people make about whether to enter the labor-market, how to or-
ganize their family lives, and how they save for the future. When welfare states direct resources 
towards families with children, for example, it can affect fertility rates, female labor force partici-
pation, and the professional preparedness of young adults. The division of labor between family, 
market and state in caring for young children or the frail elderly may affect both women’s eman-
cipation and the quality of care provided. The structure and size of public pension systems of 
course have consequences for labor costs and financial markets, but can also set limits on the 
speed and flexibility with which welfare states retool to meet new needs that affect adults during 
their working years.  
 
The redistribution carried out across age groups and generations is likely to be one of the 
most important determinant of how welfare states respond to new challenges like population 
aging, long-term unemployment, and rising divorce rates. Yet we know almost nothing about why 
countries vary in the extent of this age-based redistribution. This article offers an explanation. 
And in a striking departure from the way that we normally explain other forms of redistribution, 
this article argues that the quality of democratic competition, not its partisan or ideological con-
tent, determines the “age of welfare” in different welfare states.  
                                                 
2For cross-national data on poverty rates and poverty reduction by age group, see Cantillon (1998). For in-
come distribution see especially Forster and Pellizzari (2000).  
 
Figure 1.1: Ratio of per capita spending on the elderly to 
per capita spending on the non-elderly
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Standard welfare-state theories do not explain cross-national variation in the age-
orientation of social spending 
 
The age-orientation of social policies varies dramatically across advanced industrialized 
countries, and in ways that upset canonical notions of family relationships among different types 
of welfare states (Lynch 2001). Figure 1 shows the ratio of direct social expenditures on the eld-
erly (pensions and services for the elderly) to spending on the non-elderly (unemployment bene-
fits, active labor-market policy, family allowances, and family services), adjusted for the relative 
size of elderly and non-elderly populations in each of twenty OECD countries. The ratio gives an 
estimate of the relative weight of spending on the elderly – people aged 65 and above or in formal 
retirement – versus on working-aged adults and children. This spending-based indicator is of 
course just an approximation of the full gamut of services and benefits offered to different groups, 
but it has been shown to summarize usefully a broader array of policy areas (health, housing, 
education), policy types (services and transfers) and policy instruments (direct expenditures, tax 
expenditures, market regulation, subsidies) (Lynch 2001). 
  
The most striking feature of the age-orientation of welfare states is its transgression of the 
boundaries established by Esping-Andersen’s (1990) seminal division of advanced industrial de-
mocracies into three worlds of welfare capitalism, echoed in the more recent literature on "Varie-
ties of Capitalism" (see Hall and Soskice eds. 2001). The relief from market forces that decom-
modifying social policies provide is surely an important measure of the welfare state. But it is not 
enough to ask how much welfare states decommodify: we must also ask for whom. Social De-
mocratic welfare states do cluster at the youth-oriented end of the scale, indicating a rough bal-
ance in these countries between spending on the elderly and spending on everyone else. But 
Conservative-Corporatist regimes run the gamut from youth-oriented Belgium and the Nether-
lands to elderly-oriented Italy and Austria. Most strikingly, Liberal welfare states range from 
quite youth-oriented (Ireland, Australia) to extremely elderly-oriented (Japan, the U.S.).
3 The 
weak correspondence between the age-orientation of social policy regimes and worlds of welfare 
suggests that there is an important dimension of variation among welfare states that familiar 
typologies do not capture.  
 
The causes of divergent welfare-state characteristics typically cited in the comparative 
social-policy literature also fail to predict differing age-orientations.
4 Bivariate comparisons of 
the columns in Table 1 suggest that neither the demographic structure of a country’s population, 
its wealth or “level of development,” nor the overall size of the welfare state predict with any 
consistency how welfare states allocate resources to the elderly and non-elderly in their popu-
lations.
5
                                                 
3Alternative typologies fare no better when confronted with the data on age-orientation. Christian Democ-
ratic welfare states (van Kersbergen 1995) are as likely to be youth-oriented (the Netherlands) or age-
neutral (Germany) as they are to throw their support to the elderly (Italy). Mediterranean countries do not 
cluster neatly, either, contrary to scholarship suggesting a distinctive Southern European welfare state type 
(see for example Ferrera [1996], Leibfried [1992], Rhodes [1997]). Italy and Greece look like classic “pen-
sioner states” (Esping-Andersen 1997) but Portugal resembles Canada, the UK and Germany more closely 
than it does its Southern European neighbors.  
4See approaches in the "logic of industrialization" tradition, e.g. Flora and Alber (1981), Myles (1989), 
Wilensky (1975), and political party and "power resources" approaches, e.g. Esping-Andersen (1985 and 
1990), Stephens (2001); van Kersbergen (1995), Wilensky (1981). 
5Larger welfare states do tend to be more youth-oriented, but there are numerous examples of small, youth-
oriented welfare states (Ireland, Canada, Portugal) as well as large, elderly-oriented ones (Italy, Austria). 
This makes plain that factors apart from the aggregate level of welfare state spending must affect the age-
orientation of welfare states.  
 
Table 1: Socio-Demographic (Non-)Correlates of the Age-Orientation of Welfare States 
 
 
Country Elderly/ 
Non-Elderly 
Spending Ratio 
Elderly (age 65+) 
percent 
of total population
GDP per capita  
(purchasing 
parity adjusted $US)
Non-health social spending
as percent of GDP 
Denmark  5.75  15.3            $19,205  30.1 
Sweden 6.50  17.6  18,290  31.4 
Ireland 7.11  11.3  13,914  19.6 
Belgium 8.32  15.3 18,184  25.6 
Finland 8.86  13.7  16,447  27.8 
Australia 9.29  11.4  18,286  15.5 
Norway 9.89  16.0 20,223  26.0 
Netherlands 10.20  12.9  17,870  26.9 
United Kingdom  10.38  15.6  16,825  23.6 
New Zealand  11.42  11.2  14,595  20.4 
France 12.91  14.5  18,089  27.6 
Canada 13.95  11.5 19,532  18.6 
Spain 15.66  14.3  12,998  19.7 
Germany 15.97  14.4  18,548  25.3 
Austria 17.37  15.0  18,146  26.6 
Portugal 18.62  13.7  10,975  15.3 
Greece 24.66  14.8  10,585  20.0 
Italy 28.94  15.5  17,267  23.6 
United States  38.46  12.2  24,220  14.0 
Japan 42.31  13.2  19,308  12.2 
(mean) 10.86  13.4  17,733  23.3 
 
All figures are averages of yearly figures from 1985-1998.   
Calculated from OECD Social Expenditure Database (1996 and 2003), OECD Health Data (2003).  
 
 
Standard political “power resources” explanations fare little better than the structuralist 
variables above in multivariate and case-based analysis. The organization of labor, the prevalence 
of corporatist interest intermediation, and the strength of Left and Christian Democratic political 
parties all fall short of offering determinate answers about why welfare states vary in their em-
phasis on different age groups.
6 This is perhaps not surprising. Both working-class and Christian 
democratic parties espouse ideologies that could be used to justify either elderly-oriented or more 
age-neutral welfare states. On the Left, egalitarianism could justify an equal emphasis on the 
needs of the young and the old, but the workerist fight for deferred wages could instead lead to a 
predominance of pension spending. For Christian democrats, the social value of familial repro-
duction could imply more spending on families with children, but the emphasis on subsidiarity 
could also justify minimal state intervention in this sphere. More pragmatically, parties and un-
                                                 
6Stronger Left parties do seem to lead to more youth-oriented welfare spending, but only in the presence of 
institutions of neo-corporatist concertation. When concertation does not occur, Left parties and other parties 
push an equally elderly-oriented mix of welfare state policies (author citation deleted). Results of pooled 
time-series analysis for twenty OECD countries from 1960-1994 are available from the author upon request.  
 
ions are cross-age coalitions, and as such may adopt contradictory or difference-minimizing posi-
tions on issues related to intergenerational distribution. So even if we could deduce the age-
related policy preferences of political actors from their ideologies or social bases, the internal dy-
namics and external environments of parties and unions still affect the welfare policy positions 
that they advocate.  
 
Might family structures themselves, rather than ideologies about families, explain differ-
ences in patterns of social spending on different age groups? Observers of Southern European 
politics, in particular, argue that the prevalence of multi-generational families and a pervasive fa-
milialist orientation in these countries account for the under-development of public policies rang-
ng from child care to social services to unemployment benefits.
7 It is certainly plausible that co-
hesive extended families engaging in extensive intrafamilial resource sharing make it possible for 
Southern European countries (and perhaps Japan) to sustain high levels of unemployment without 
falling prey to debilitating social conflict between labor-market “insiders” (primarily older, male 
workers and pensioners) and “outsiders” (e.g., first-time job seekers, women, the long-term 
unemployed).  
 
It is far from clear, however, that family structures are the cause of limited benefits for 
working-age adults and children in Southern European countries, rather than the other way 
around. Jurado (2002) demonstrates that housing and labor markets in Southern Europe, rather 
than sociocultural features, are responsible for the long permanence of adult children in their par-
ents’ households. And while Southern European welfare states do rely on extended family struc-
tures to a greater extent than in other countries (Millar and Warman 1996, Naldini 2003), this is 
in some regards a rather recent phenomenon. The tendency for social legislation to focus on the 
family as primary caregiver and source of income support seems to be a result of increasing 
demands and decreasing welfare-state resources, rather than a result of the impact of a familialist 
culture (Addis 1999, Saraceno 1999).  
 
Relations between the generations within families do not seem to determine the allocation 
of public resources to different age groups. But what happens when age-based groups go public 
with their claims on resources? Some theorists argue that state spending on pensions is a result of 
the influence of “Gray Power”: large blocs of elderly voters with well-defined policy preferences. 
In one of the first quantitative cross-national studies of the welfare state, Wilensky (1975) argued 
that elderly populations influence the development of welfare-state spending because large elder-
ly populations create both a need for more welfare spending, and a political constituency to fight 
for the allocation of resources. Pampel and Williamson (1989) likewise found that in democratic 
countries the “political pressure of a large aged population” is an important influence on spend-
ing. Yet these cross-sectional predictions do not fare particularly well empirically. Strikingly, the 
most youth-oriented welfare state in our sample, Sweden, has the oldest population structure (see 
Table 1).  
 
The dynamic version of the basic Gray Power hypothesis would lead us to expect all 
countries to become more elderly-oriented as elderly voting blocs become larger and more im-
portant. One author in fact posits the aging of a politically powerful “welfare generation” as the 
driving force behind the growing emphasis of welfare states on programs for the elderly from the 
1970s onward (Thomson 1989). Yet even in the most elderly-oriented welfare states, where we 
might expect seniors’ political voice to be strongest because of policy feedback effects (Pierson 
1994, Weaver 1987), this pattern is not evident. Many of the most youth-oriented countries in the 
OECD have in fact become more youth-oriented between 1980 and 2000 (Lynch 2001). 
 
                                                 
7See for example Jurado and Naldini (1996), Moreno (1997).  
 
The effective political organization of pensioners is clearly required to transform sheer 
numbers of pensioners into elderly-oriented social policies. But even this may not be enough. 
Mounting evidence throws into question the Gray Power assumption that the political influence 
of the elderly implies similar policy outcomes over time and space – particularly when welfare 
states are under construction, rather than during retrenchment. Wilensky (1990) adds nuance to 
his earlier assumptions about the influence of the elderly, asserting their probable interest in 
welfare-state spending on children as well as seniors. Williamson and Pampel (1993) find that in 
the presence of neocorporatist policymaking institutions large elderly populations can lead to less, 
not more, elderly-oriented spending. Gray Power taken out of its specific political and institution-
al context thus does not seem able to explain the age-orientation of social spending.  
 
The age structure of the population, ideologies about redistribution across the life-course, 
and the political power of groups with age-related policy agendas are weak predictors of the age-
orientation of welfare states. This is because the age-orientation of social policies is not, in fact, 
related to social structural, partisan, or institutional features that are overtly connected to age. 
Rather, the distinct age profiles of social-policy regimes are a largely unintended consequence of 
how welfare-state programs are structured, and how politicians typically compete within a party 
system. The next section presents an explanation for the variation in age profiles of social policy 
regimes in which early choices about the structure of welfare programs combine with distinctive 
modes of political competition in different countries to account for the development over time of 
differing age-orientations.  
 
Program structure and political competition: key determinants of the age of welfare 
 
How are the organization of social programs and the mode of political competition re-
lated to one another, and ultimately to the age-orientation of social spending? To simplify drama-
tically, the age-orientation of social spending is determined by the structure of welfare-state 
programs (citizenship-based or occupational), and the structure of welfare-state programs is deter-
mined by the dominant mode of political competition in a polity (programmatic or patronage-
oriented). Citizenship-based social programs and programmatic politics reinforce each other to 
produce youth-oriented welfare states, while occupationalist program design and the politics of 
patronage lead to more elderly-oriented social policies. 
 
Before examining the argument in more detail, it is useful to define some terms. First, the 
structure of social programs: we can think about welfare-state regimes as lying along a continuum 
defined by the structure of the major social programs like old-age pensions, unemployment bene-
fits, and family allowances. Most welfare states have a mix of universalist and occupationalist 
social programs, so we should take care to distinguish degrees as well as kinds of organizational 
profiles. For the purposes of this analysis, though, the distinction between primarily universalist 
(e.g., Sweden, the United Kingdom), primarily occupationalist (e.g. Italy, Japan), and mixed (e.g., 
France, Germany) welfare states is sufficiently fine-grained.
8  
 
In citizenship-based regimes welfare benefits may be either means-tested or truly univer-
sal. In either case eligibility and the level of the basic benefit is the same regardless of an individ-
ual's job title, sector of employment, size of firm, duration of working life, or even degree of at-
tachment to the labor-market. All citizenship-based systems cover people without strong ties to 
the labor-market (labor-market “outsiders”), such as single mothers, children, the indigent, or the 
long-term unemployed. Within the citizenship-based family of welfare states, means-tested sys-
                                                 
8Ferrera (1993) emphasizes the fundamental nature of the universalist-occupationalist divide. Other schol-
ars assign slightly different labels (e.g., Beveridgean versus Bismarckian) to the same basic distinction 
(Baldwin 1990, Bonoli 1997).   
 
tems (e.g., the United Kingdom) typically leave labor-market “insiders” (full-time workers in the 
formal labor-market, pensioners, and often their spouses and children) to procure, either from em-
ployers or the market, their own insurance against risks like ill health or old age. Universalist 
citizenship-based systems (e.g., Denmark), by contrast, provide public citizenship-based protec-
tion for workers and pensioners in addition to benefits for labor-market outsiders.  
 
On the other end of the spectrum are occupational regimes, in which eligibility for and/or 
the quality of a full spectrum of social benefits varies according to a person’s connection to the 
labor market. Workers in small firms or in uninsured sectors (e.g., agriculture, domestic work, the 
informal sector) and people with short, spotty, or no history of employment may be excluded 
from social protections altogether. Benefit levels for the insured population replicate labor-market 
stratification because benefits are often pegged to prior wages. But occupational systems also 
generate stratification and fragmentation because other variables of importance in determining 
benefit levels – replacement rates, waiting periods, the reference period for prior earnings, the 
kind and number of dependents insured – may also vary across firms and sectors. 
 
The mode of political competition also varies along a continuum, ranging from program-
matic to patronage-oriented. Programmatic competition occurs when politicians and parties vie 
for votes by promising to enact policies that they argue will benefit society at large. This type of 
political competition is characterized by the relatively low degree of selectivity of the beneficiary 
groups (e.g., entire classes, rather than particular industries, neighborhoods, or ethnic groups.) To 
the extent that policies are designed to benefit somewhat selective groups (e.g., the working class) 
rather than the public at large, they are justified with reference to coherent political ideologies.
9  
 
At the other end of the spectrum of competitive strategies lie a range of patronage-
oriented practices, from log-rolling, constituency-service, and intensive interest group involve-
ment in policymaking to an out-and-out exchange of benefits for votes: wherever politicians offer 
benefits to selective groups of voters in return for their votes.
10 Patronage politics may or may not 
be justified rhetorically with reference to political ideologies or the common good. A politician 
operating in this environment might offer, for example, to introduce favorable public pension leg-
islation affecting workers in a single industry, in the expectation that the beneficiaries of the pro-
posed policies would reward the politician with their votes. 
 
Measuring the mode of political competition in a polity presents a number of challenges. 
Both programmatic and particularistic modes of political exchange operate in all polities, so what 
we are really trying to measure is the rough balance of the two. But determining the nature of po-
litical appeals is not always straightforward. As Piattoni 2001, p. 6, fn. 9) notes, “The most strik-
ing feature of mass clientelism is that, in an effort to truly reach the masses, it often works 
through fairly impersonal means, such as the passage of laws or implementation of measures that 
favor entire categories of persons.” The wide variety of practices included under the umbrella 
term patronage make it difficult to establish the extent of the phenomenon in any comprehensive 
way. And the opprobrium with which many of these practices are viewed makes it difficult to ob-
tain reliable information about the extent to which they occur in any given polity.  
 
 
                                                 
9A variety of different labels have been attached to this phenomenon, e.g., “responsible party government,” 
“universalism.” In Shefter’s seminal work (1993, ch. 2), policy-orientation is the polar opposite of 
patronage-orientation. I reject this label because patronage-oriented politicians are no less concerned with 
policies, they simply care about policies for distributive rather than programmatic reasons.  
10Alternate labels include “clientelism” and “particularism.” For a useful discussion of the subtle distinc-
tions between patronage and clientelism, see Piattoni (2001). I use the terms interchangeably to denote be-
haviors that meet the definition offered above.  
 
Figure 2: Watersheds of Welfare State Regime Formation 
 
First Great Divide 
(Late 19
th-early 20
th C.) 
 
               “Outsider”           “Insider” 
         Protecting                 Protecting 
 
 
 
Citizenship-Based 
Welfare Regimes 
Occupational 
Welfare Regimes 
  
  
 
Second Great Divide 
(Around WWII) 
 
 
 
            Programmatic                             Particularistic 
                 Political                                       Political 
            Competition                                          Competition 
 
 
 
 
Citizenship-Based Systems 
(Universalist and Means-Tested)  
Mixed  
Systems 
Pure 
Occupational 
Systems 
Youth-Oriented Welfare States  Age-Neutral  
Welfare States 
Elderly-Oriented 
Welfare States 
 
 
Still, there is wide agreement about the degree to which political life is dominated by 
patronage-orientated versus programmatic parties and politicians in the different countries of the 
OECD. Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the United States are uniformly classi-
fied as possessing distinctively particularistic styles of politics and policymaking. France and Por-
tugal occupy a middle ground, while political competition in the remaining countries of North-
western Europe, Canada and the Antipodes is described as primarily programmatic.
11 
 
                                                 
11See, for example, Shefter (1993), Blondel and Cotta (2000), Kitschelt (2000), Cazorla (1992), García and 
Karakatsanis (2001), Hopkin (2001), Lyrintzis (1984). Corruption rankings (e.g., those summarized in 
Kaufmann, Kray et al. 2003) can be combined with expert evaluations of clientelism to triangulate in a 
situation of imperfect measurement. Corruption rankings generally concur with the intensity of patronage 
politics noted in case studies. Greece, Italy, Japan and Belgium suffer from both high levels of corruption 
and strongly particularistic politics, whereas Austria, the US and Spain score somewhat lower on both 
counts. Some scales report some problems with corruption in Portugal and France, while the remaining 
countries of Northwestern Europe, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are apparently corruption-free 
zones.  
 
Having defined our key terms related to the organization of social programs and of politi-
cal competition, we can now move on to an explanation of how these features of welfare states 
influence the age-orientation of welfare states. The argument can be previewed in the form of a 
branching tree, as in Figure 2. At two critical junctures the welfare states of the industrialized de-
mocracies set out upon trajectories towards divergent age-orientations. From the first critical 
juncture in the early twentieth century, when industrialized nations established different kinds of 
public social provision in their attempts to grapple with the emerging “social question,” two 
groups of countries emerged with welfare states organized according to radically different logics: 
either citizenship-based or occupationally-based. In interaction with demographic and economic 
shifts, these organizational forms matured over the course of the twentieth century into welfare 
states of different age-orientations. Citizenship-based programs became more youth-oriented with 
the passage of time, while occupational programs contained within them the seeds of elderly-
oriented social spending.  
 
But in order for these divergent age-orientations to become manifest, the original choice 
of program design had to be maintained well into the postwar period. At a second critical juncture 
around the Second World War, when public social provisions were reimagined through the lens 
of national solidarity, countries with occupational social programs in fact set out on two different 
tracks: one maintained occupationally-based family allowance, unemployment and pension pro-
grams, while the members of the other group replaced many of their prewar occupational pro-
grams with citizenship-based ones. This second parting of ways is explained and reinforced by 
the predominant mode of political competition in these countries, either programmatic or 
patronage-oriented.  
 
The impact of program structure on the age-orientation of social policies 
 
We can divide welfare states into three groups based on the structure of the major social 
programs that make up their mature welfare states: predominantly citizenship-based, predomi-
nantly occupational, or mixed. Then ranking countries according to the age-orientation of their 
social spending during the latter part of the twentieth century, as in Figure 3, the relationship 
between welfare-state structure and age-orientation becomes clear. Welfare states with a long his-
tory of citizenship-based social programs are the most youth-oriented, welfare states that mix oc-
cupational and citizenship-based programs have intermediate age-orientations, and pure occupa-
tional regimes are extremely elderly-oriented in their spending patterns. 
 
The relative youth-orientation of citizenship-based welfare states comes about because in 
these systems social programs cover all citizens (sometimes even all residents) of a country, 
regardless of their status in the labor market. This means that citizenship-based welfare states pro-
vide benefits for relatively youthful groups of labor-market outsiders like single mothers, chil-
dren, and youth unemployed in addition to the standard repertoire of benefits for current and for-
mer workers in the core labor force. Occupationally-based social programs, on the other hand, 
spend relatively little on these youthful constituencies. In occupational systems benefits for labor-
market outsiders are most often provided by private charities or family members, not the public 
purse. Where women and children do have entitlements to public benefits, it is typically by virtue 
of their relationships to members of the core work force. These benefits are thus often cast as 
wage supplements, not as individual entitlements, and are correspondingly lower.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3: Age-orientation, program structure, and mode of political competition 
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Occupational social programs are also elderly-oriented because their core constituency of 
labor-market insiders is an aging one. Large numbers of fully vested pensioners draw from ma-
ture public occupational pension systems that pay out more per pensioner than they did in the 
1950s. At the same time, occupational systems, often financed through mounting payroll taxes 
that discourage new hires, insure that even the non-retired segment of the labor-market insider 
pool is growing older. “Fortress” labor markets in the occupational welfare states of continental 
Europe work to keep newer, younger workers out of the protected core. As a consequence, public 
spending on non-retired labor-market insiders grows more elderly-oriented as well. 
 
The structure of core welfare-state programs is clearly correlated with the age-orientation 
of welfare states in the late twentieth century (Figure 3). Quite surprisingly, this is true regardless 
of the size of aggregate welfare-state spending relative to GDP, and regardless of whether pro-
grams are means-tested or not. But as strong as the correlation between program structure and 
age-orientation is, it is important to note that the age-orientation of welfare states is a largely un-
intended consequence of program structures set into place in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. In this earlier period, the age-orientations implied by citizenship-based versus oc-
cupational welfare states were in fact the reverse. Citizenship-based programs spent primarily on  
 
the indigent elderly, while occupational regimes protected a youthful core work force and their 
families. 
 
  The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries marked the beginning of a rapid phase 
of welfare-state development in the countries of Europe, North America, and the British Com-
monwealth, largely in response to industrialization and pressure from new political actors. There 
were two fundamentally different ways that welfare states grew: along either citizenship or occu-
pational lines.
12 In citizenship-based systems, the core of the welfare state was made up of pro-
grams designed to complement, rather than replace, benefits provided by mutual associations for 
their members (policies like old-age and invalidity pensions, unemployment insurance, health in-
surance, etc.) (Manow 1997). Welfare-state programs in citizenship-based regimes thus covered 
labor-market outsiders. For example, in the United Kingdom in 1910, outdoor relief, which in-
cluded income maintenance programs for the poor of all ages, and non-contributory old age pen-
sions accounted for 84 percent of all public social-welfare spending, while social insurance pro-
grams for risks like occupational accidents and disease accounted for only 16 percent. And there 
were no public programs at all for unemployment insurance or occupational pensions (data from 
Ritter 1983, p. 194). These work-related programs were instead provided by non-state actors, in 
the form of Britain’s friendly societies. 
 
In occupational regimes, by contrast, the state took over from mutualist organizations the 
job of protecting people with tight links to unions and the labor market. State welfare provision 
focused on social insurance programs for labor-market insiders. In Germany in 1910, for exam-
ple, 52 percent of the labor force was enrolled in public occupational pensions, 51 percent in pub-
lic occupationally-linked health insurance, and 87 percent in public occupational injury insurance 
(data from Flora and Alber 1981, pp. 74-77). But basic social assistance and poverty alleviation 
were relegated to religious charities, municipalities, and above all families. The task of caring for 
labor-market outsiders in occupational regimes fell to non-state actors.  
 
Citizenship-based regimes originated by providing state protection for labor-market out-
siders, and occupational regimes for labor-market insiders, and these differences in focus persist 
to this day. Occupational welfare states often still lack comprehensive social safety nets for the 
poorest citizens, for example, while many citizenship-based systems provide only basic old-age 
pensions and leave the provision of supplementary retirement income to private actors. But the 
age composition of what I have termed labor-market insider and outsider groups has changed as 
welfare states and private insurance markets have matured over the course of the twentieth cen-
tury. As a result, citizenship-based and occupational social programs have different consequences 
for the age-orientation of welfare states now than they did one hundred years ago. 
 
One of the primary causes of the demographic transformation of insider and outsider 
groups over the twentieth century is the development of private insurance markets. The limited 
supply of retirement insurance options in the early twentieth century meant that, in citizenship-
based regimes, where public old-age insurance was limited, most former workers were labor- 
market outsiders: people who had no way of maintaining a continuing personal connection to the 
wages (or deferred wages) generated by work. When people became too old to work, they turned 
to their families and to the state to protect them from poverty. Indeed, the majority of the labor- 
market outsiders covered by the public welfare programs in citizenship-based regimes in the early 
twentieth century were elderly people who had ceased working and had sunk into poverty. As a 
                                                 
12My task here is not to explain this initial divide, which in any case has been done elsewhere (see in par-
ticular Baldwin 1989, Ferrera 1993, Manow 1997). Rather, I am interested in the consequences of this fun-
damental decision about the welfare state's organization for its eventual age-orientation.   
 
result, citizenship-based regimes in the early twentieth century were quite elderly-oriented com-
pared to their current age profile.  
 
As markets for occupational pension insurance matured, more and more of the elderly be-
came covered under employment-based pensions.
13 Fewer and fewer of them were left as out-
siders to be cared for by the state. Once most of the elderly poor were removed from the outsider 
group, citizenship-based regimes became much more youth-oriented. The pool of labor-market 
outsiders who constitute these regimes’ core constituency now has come to be dominated by 
young people: children, the long-term unemployed, single-parent families, and the like. As a 
result, by the latter part of the twentieth century outsider-protecting citizenship-based welfare 
regimes have become quite youth-oriented. 
 
  The reverse transformation occurred in occupational welfare states. These countries be-
gan the twentieth century with fairly youth-oriented social policy regimes. Social programs like 
public occupational injury insurance covered labor-market insiders, not outsiders. And in the 
early twentieth century, employment-related old-age pensions that brought retirees into the in-
sider camp receiving state protection were rare. But as employment-related pensions – which in 
occupational welfare states were provided by the state – expanded to cover more people in more 
sectors of the economy, more and more retired people became insiders. Insider-protecting occu-
pational systems thus have grown increasingly elderly-oriented over the course of the twentieth 
century as pension systems have matured.  
 
The maturation of private and public employment-related old-age pension systems is not 
the only reason for the reversal in the age-orientation of citizenship-based and occupational wel-
fare states. As we have seen, the aging of the protected core workforce has meant that in occupa-
tional systems even public programs like unemployment insurance or disability pensions that 
once benefited the relatively young now tend to be skewed towards older workers. Changes in 
marriage patterns and fertility behavior, as well as life expectancy, also have an impact on the age 
composition of outsider and insider groups. The important point is that occupational programs 
lead to more elderly spending, and citizenship-based programs lead to more spending on young 
people, despite the fact that in the early twentieth century these different types of systems had 
opposite age-orientations. Static welfare-state institutions thus interact with dynamic social struc-
tures and markets for labor and insurance to create a pattern of social policy spending that ma-
tures over time to result in the age-orientations we observe in the 1990s. But what kept these 
welfare-state institutions static?  
 
The impact of political competition on program structure and age-orientation 
 
What was the “reproduction mechanism” (Thelen 1999) that reinforced decisions about 
program structure made in the early twentieth century, such that these early choices about 
welfare-state institutions play out over the long run to produce the age-orientations we observe 
today? How political competition is organized in different countries helps explain why occupa-
tional programs persisted in some countries but not others – and in turn why some countries with 
similar welfare program structures in 1900 end up with very different age-orientations at the end 
of the century.  
 
Welfare-state institutions are often characterized by policy feedback mechanisms that 
make them rather sticky. But they can and do change under certain circumstances. We can think 
                                                 
13One of the things that advanced industrial capitalism does rather well is look after retired workers – per-
haps, as Myles (1989) argues, because it is in the interests of employers to move older people out of manu-
facturing jobs to make way for more productive younger workers.  
 
about the first critical juncture, the initial choice between occupational and citizenship-based re-
gimes in the early twentieth century, as setting countries off on one of two tracks of welfare-state 
development. But an opportunity to switch tracks occurred in the period around the Great Depres-
sion and World War II. The 1930s and 1940s were a time of great institutional fluidity, when 
many advanced industrialized countries had an opportunity to reevaluate and rebuild their welfare 
programs. Wartime conditions aggravated social problems, while in many countries a drive for 
national unity fostered during World War II contributed to a new push for national social pro-
grams. In addition, both public and private insurance programs had been bankrupted throughout 
much of Europe because of runaway inflation and wartime destruction of property. This presented 
occupational welfare states, in particular, with a prime opportunity to experiment with new forms 
of social protection.  
 
In most European countries with occupational welfare states, governments commissioned 
official studies to investigate the feasibility of introducing citizenship-based welfare programs 
along the lines of the Beveridge Plan in Britain. Such inquiries occurred in France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Germany and Italy in the period between 1945 and 1948 (Ferrera 1993). 
Under the influence of the International Labour Organization
14 and policy lessons diffusing from 
Britain, some countries that before World War II had had purely occupational welfare systems 
adopted citizenship-based programs, beginning the process of switching tracks. But an equal 
number of occupational regimes stayed the course, despite the conclusions of government advi-
sory panels that encouraged the adoption of British-style citizenship-based benefits. 
 
The countries that in the 1980s and 1990s had the most elderly-oriented social spending – 
Italy, the United States, Japan, Spain, Greece – were welfare states that entered World War II 
with occupational social programs and never, or only very recently, added a significant layer of 
citizenship-based benefits. Other countries that had occupational welfare states after World War 
II – the Netherlands, Germany, France – were able to “switch tracks” from occupationalism to de-
velop more youth-oriented citizenship-based programs. What accounts for the different pathways 
pursued by these two groups of countries following the second critical juncture? I argue that the 
path to highly elderly-oriented social policies versus a more moderate age-orientation is above all 
determined by the way that politicians use social benefits and other policies like taxation and 
labor-market policies to compete with one another.
15  
 
Occupationalism transformed versus occupationalism reinforced: the Dutch and Italian 
cases
16 
 
A brief summary of the development of welfare-state programs in Italy and the Nether-
lands helps to illustrate the mechanisms through which patronage politics and occupational 
welfare programs reinforced each other in postwar welfare states. Both Italy and the Netherlands 
had pure occupational welfare regimes before World War II, and in both countries after the war 
                                                 
14Such was the enthusiasm for the Beveridgean model at this time that ILO recommendations included 
citizenship-based prescriptions, despite the fact that the ILO was dominated by countries with occupational-
ist social insurance systems. 
15Again, my task here is not to account for the differences in the mode of political competition among OECD 
countries, or to debate whether these differences are reducible to culture (Putnam et al. 1993), institutions 
(Shefter 1993, Kumlin and Rothstein forthcoming), or incentives (Piattoni et al 2001). It is enough to note 
that these differences exist, and are of long enough standing to affect the development of the tax systems 
necessary to underwrite social insurance programs. 
16Much more extensive treatments of the development of family allowance, unemployment and pension 
policies in Italy and the Netherlands can be found in Chapters 4 through 6 of my book manuscript The Age 
of Welfare (currently under review).  
 
official reform commissions (the D’Aragona Commission in Italy, the Van Rhijn Commision in 
the Netherlands) expressed the desirability of moving towards a universalist, citizenship-based 
system. Other similarities, too, might have pushed the Netherlands and Italy to follow a similar 
path after the war. In both countries the major expansion of the welfare state in the postwar period 
was carried out under coalitions dominated by Christian democratic parties, yielding male-
breadwinner-centered models of social provision and placing both countries in the Conservative-
Corporatist world of welfare. At the same time, in both countries Left parties enjoyed substantial 
influence in social policymaking even though they rarely controlled the responsible ministerial 
positions, and despite the fact that labor-relations regimes were characterized by numerically 
weak unions and sporadic tripartite concertation. Both the Dutch and Italian welfare states have 
been characterized as “Red-Roman” because of this combination of Christian democratic and so-
cial democratic influences on social policy development (Ferrera 1993). Yet a crucial difference 
stands out: the Netherlands shifted social provision in a number of key areas to a citizenship-
based model after World War II, while Italy, despite repeated attempts, did not. As a result, the 
Netherlands entered the 1990s with a far more youth-oriented welfare state than did Italy.  
 
Why did Italy remain an occupational welfare state, while the Netherlands adopted many 
citizenship-based programs? The key to understanding this difference is the very different way 
that political competition is organized in the two countries. Italian politics during much of the 
postwar period has been famously, and often spectacularly, patronage-oriented. Politics in the 
Netherlands has tended towards the programmatic end of the spectrum. This difference explains 
why the Netherlands was able to adopt citizenship-based welfare programs like universal pen-
sions, universal family allowances, and a basic social minimum, while Italy, despite repeated at-
tempts to do so, could not. The development of family allowance policies, unemployment-related 
benefits, and old-age pensions in Italy and the Netherlands illustrates how the structure of social 
programs and the competitive behavior of politicians interact to produce an elderly-oriented wel-
fare state in Italy, and more youth-oriented spending in the Netherlands.  
 
Italy’s elderly-oriented welfare state at the end of the twentieth century is characterized 
by fragmented occupational social programs that do very little for working-aged adults and chil-
dren. Spending on family allowances and services for families with children accounts for less 
than 4 percent of all social spending, a smaller share than in any European country save Greece 
(data from Eurostat 2000). Regular unemployment insurance provides a replacement rate of only 
40 percent of prior earnings, again at the bottom of the European scale, and throughout the 1990s 
less than 5 percent of the unemployed were able to claim benefits (data from Eurostat, various 
years). First-time job-seekers, who make up 54 percent of the unemployed in Italy (Eurostat 
1996), have no entitlement to support. Despite more generous provisions for some sectors and 
some firms (up to 80 percent of prior earnings for workers in specified firms and industries under-
going restructuring), aggregate spending on labor-market supports per unemployed person is 
among the lowest in the OECD.
17 By contrast, Italian pension spending is lavish, even if the dis-
tribution of this spending means that some pensioners enjoy replacement rates in excess of 100 
percent of prior earnings while many more receive pensions below the subsistence level.  
 
The relatively youth-oriented Dutch welfare state, on the other hand, has universal 
citizenship-based benefits for working-aged adults and children. Family allowances and services 
for families are not overly generous compared to Scandinavian programs, but are still more com-
prehensive than in Italy: the basic allowance for a child living in a family with two parents and 
two children in the Netherlands is almost five times the allowance in Italy.
18 Active and passive 
                                                 
17 Data from OECD Labour Force Statistics and OECD Social Expenditures Database. 
18 94 Euro per month in the Netherlands versus 19 Euro per month in Italy. The child allowance benefit in 
the Netherlands varies according to the child's age and number of children in the family. The figure re- 
 
labor-market programs provide support for first-time job-seekers and the long-term unemployed, 
unlike in Italy, and the replacement rate for regular unemployment benefits (80 percent of prior 
gross wages, dropping to 70 percent only in 1987) is among the highest in the OECD. The public 
pension system provides a moderate flat-rate benefit that insures a decent standard of living for 
virtually every person over age 65 in living in the Netherlands. This system is supplemented by a 
system of publicly-guaranteed private occupational pensions with a maximum replacement rate of 
80 percent of prior earnings.  
 
These very different constellations of policy features in Italy and the Netherlands today 
can be explained by the mutually-reinforcing dynamics of social-policy development and political 
competition in the two countries over the second half of the twentieth century. Once Britain’s vic-
tory in World War II insured that the Beveridgean model would become the archetype of the 
“modern” welfare state, universal, citizenship-based programs like those in the Netherlands be-
came the stock-in-trade of programmatically-oriented politicians seeking to make their mark by 
providing public goods, rather than private benefits. Programmatically-inspired political competi-
tion in the Netherlands in the postwar period spurred the development of universal social pro-
grams to complement or replace preexisting occupational ones. Politicians in Italy also sought to 
use the programs of the welfare state to generate electoral support. Much as in the Netherlands, 
Italy’s moderate Communist party hoped to consolidate its working- and middle-class base by of-
fering a vision of a new, universal, citizenship-based system. But Italian Christian Democratic 
politicians’ strategic use of the welfare-state, tax system, and public employment service soon 
made the goal of universalism seem less possible, and less desirable, to the Left.  
 
When politicians in the Netherlands used the welfare state to “buy” votes during periods 
of intense electoral competition, the universalization of benefits like family allowances and 
pensions was one result. Politicians fought to transform occupational social programs into 
citizenship-based ones in order to extend coverage to a key constituency, the self-employed. But 
in Italy, when social programs became the currency of electoral competition, they were not 
universalized. Clientelist politicians wooed the self-employed with new, tailor-made provisions of 
their own, or else allowed them to remain outside the social insurance system and so preserve 
privileged tax treatment.  
 
The effects of particularistic political competition are felt not just in the welfare state it-
self, but also in the tax systems that underlie social programs. Clientelist domination of the legis-
lature and the public administration in Italy in the early postwar years impinged on the devel-
opment of a well-functioning tax system. Politicians and tax collectors looked the other way as 
valuable electoral constituencies like the self-employed failed to report income or pay taxes on 
the income they did report. A fragmented and highly complex tax system eventually reified many 
of the special privileges granted in practice to valuable allies of the Christian Democratic party. 
The result was a tax system in Italy that could not support, either financially or politically, the 
weight of citizenship-based social programs.  
 
While the Left in Italy had in the 1950s and 1960s advocated a set of universal, 
citizenship-based social entitlements, the political coalitions advocating universal family allow-
ances, unemployment benefits and old-age pensions unraveled by the 1970s. The Italian Socialist 
party had moved towards the center, and, sharing in government with the dominant Christian De-
                                                                                                                                                 
ported refers to the allowance for a child aged 12 to 17 years living in a household with two children. Fam-
ily allowances in Italy depend on size of household and family income. The figure reported is one half of 
the allowance granted to a family with two dependents with an income of approximately 30,000 Euro. Data 
can be found on the MISSOC web site, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/missoc/2003 (ac-
cessed January, 2004).  
 
mocratic party, had become firmly enmeshed in the clientelist system. At the same time, twenty 
years of piecemeal expansion of the Italian welfare state had taught the Communist party and its 
allies in the labor movement that “universalizing” social insurance could only mean adding 
benefits for the self-employed while continuing to finance them out of taxes paid by employees. 
Particularistic use of the tax system had made universal social programs impossible in Italy. In 
the Netherlands, quite the opposite occurred: there, a capable fiscal administration was the pre-
condition for agreements that extended occupational family allowances, unemployment benefits 
and old-age pensions into a full-fledged safety net entitling the self-employed and non-employed, 
as well as the employed, to social insurance benefits.  
 
Particularistic use of the tax system in Italy insured that occupational social programs 
could not be replaced. But these programs, which provided different levels and types of benefits 
for different groups of workers, were also a gold mine for politicians who used particularistic 
strategies to compete for votes and win elections. Multiple, differentiated benefit categories with-
in a single program – like the seventy-two separate public pension funds that existed in Italy prior 
to the 1994 pension system reform (Baccaro 2000), or the dozen or so different kinds of cash 
benefits for the unemployed – are not just ex post evidence that politicians used the welfare state 
to target benefits to small groups of voters. The existence of such fragmentation also made it eas-
ier to justify new forms of discretionary targeting of benefits like a better replacement rate here, 
or a shorter reference income period there.  
 
Provisions tailor-made for small segments of the electorate are visible and valuable to the 
beneficiaries, and hence to their benefactors. But as the fragmentation of the Italian welfare state 
increased, the very complexity and opacity of what Italian commentators have come to call 
“micro-corporativism” comes to protect the politicians who engage in it. A thicket of highly spe-
cialized provisions makes it difficult for the public (and sometimes even for policymakers) to 
know when changes have occurred, and even harder for them to understand what the conse-
quences of such changes might be for the public interest. For all of these reasons, politicians who 
compete using patronage have been loath to see occupational fragmentation overturned, or even 
reformed.  
 
Occupational social programs “stuck” in Italy for two main reasons. First, particularistic 
political competition made it difficult to develop neutral state capacities like strong tax systems or 
well-functioning labor exchanges that are necessary to make universal social programs politically 
and financially viable. Second, occupational welfare programs themselves provided valuable re-
sources for patronage-oriented politicians. In the Netherlands, neutral state capacities provided 
strong foundations for universal, citizenship-based programs. These programs, in their transpar-
ency and lack of differentiated benefits, both reflected and encouraged programmatic political 
competition. 
 
The distinction between occupational and citizenship-based social programs also affected 
the demand-side of social policymaking in important, if less obvious, ways. Prior to the 1960s, 
benefits for children and working-aged adults were, in Continental Europe, typically cast as wage 
supplements. Family allowances were put in place to make up for wage restraint or reduced 
hours; unemployment benefits were extended to those excluded from the labor market on a long-
term basis only in cases of emergency or restructuring. When such benefits become a part of the 
apparatus of a citizenship-based welfare system, though, as they did in the Netherlands in the 
1960s, they take on a different meaning. No longer simply wage supplements, in the Netherlands 
family allowances and long-term unemployment benefits grew into full-fledged entitlements,  
 
with accompanying expectations about the appropriate level of the benefit.
19 In Italy, however, 
where family allowances and benefits for the unemployed remained occupational in nature, bene-
fit levels were allowed to drift downwards as wages and standards of living grew. Non-indexation 
of unemployment benefits and of family allowances in Italy doubly doomed those programs: as 
long as wages were rising few people noticed that the benefit levels were falling, and once the 
benefit had shrunk to insignificance, very few people cared. 
 
Universal programs for the non-elderly grew quite rapidly in the Netherlands in the 1960s 
and 1970s because, once divorced from wages, these benefits turned into expensive individual 
entitlements. At the same time, their undifferentiated structure meant that if politicians used these 
programs in an attempt to capture the votes of any group interested in the program, benefit levels 
would increase across the board. A raise for one is a raise for all in a citizenship-based social pro-
gram. Occupational programs in Italy, on the other hand, could remain modest, and still provide 
valuable currency to politicians. Even cash rewards too small to be much more than symbolic 
could be used to secure votes, as long as there were people who were not getting anything at all. 
Family allowances provide a clear example. Even after benefit levels had shrunk to insignificance 
due to non-indexation, clientelist politicians in the Socialist party continued to expand the system 
to cover new groups as a way to consolidate their support.  
 
  If even small youth-oriented benefits can be useful for particularistic politicians in an un-
saturated marketplace, large and highly salient benefits like old-age pensions take on a life of 
their own. Differently situated constituencies press for ever-better benefits, and the lack of trans-
parency inherent to fragmented occupational regimes makes it possible for politicians to provide 
without invoking the public’s wrath. This situation has made Italy's pension system extraordinar-
ily resistant to change – more resilient, I would argue, than a simple constituency-feedback model 
would suggest.  
 
In universal, citizenship-based pension systems like the Netherlands, on the other hand, 
private or supplementary occupational pensions can act as a release-valve for pressures to in-
crease pensions. This safeguard is necessary since the budgetary consequences of increasing 
benefit levels in a universal program that provides even a modest income for retirement are so 
visible. Universal benefits that by their nature are relatively large – i.e. provide more than tempo-
rary or partial income support for large groups of people – thus are more resistant to expansionary 
politicking than are either fragmented occupational benefits, or smaller citizenship-based benefits 
like family allowances and unemployment benefits. 
 
  Particularistic political competition in Italy locked into place preexisting occupational 
programs, resulting in declining benefits for the non-elderly, and an explosion of pension spend-
ing. In the Netherlands, citizenship-based programs grew on a base of neutral state capacities pro-
vided by programmatic political competition, and in turn reinforced the tendency in that system to 
compete along programmatic lines. The development of social spending in different areas – 
strong growth in the area of new entitlements of the non-elderly, and more cautious growth in the 
larger old-age pension program – resulted in a relatively youth-oriented welfare state.  
 
The results for how well the welfare states work for different population groups in Italy 
and the Netherlands are stark. After redistribution carried out by taxes and welfare-state programs 
is taken into account, children are more than twice as likely to be poor in Italy (17 percent) as in 
the Netherlands (8 percent). Among the advanced industrial democracies, only the United States 
and Greece have higher post-tax and transfer child poverty rates than Italy (Forster and Pellizzari 
                                                 
19Bussemaker (1992) usefully discusses this transformation with reference to the “individualization” – ex-
tension to women as an independent entitlement – of benefits previously reserved for male breadwinners.  
 
2000). Importantly, outcomes for typical seniors are little better in countries like Italy where cli-
entelism directs high volumes of resources to the privileged elderly. People over age 65 in Italy 
are less likely than children to be poor, as they are in most countries. But poverty rates among the 
elderly (14 percent) are still quite high compared to other OECD countries, including the Nether-
lands (6 percent). High aggregate levels of spending concentrated in pensions for the lucky few 
who benefit from clientelist policymaking do little to reduce poverty among the elderly, and are 
reflected in much higher levels of income inequality among the elderly than in the Netherlands.
20  
 
Generalizing the model 
 
The Dutch and Italian case studies flesh out the mechanisms behind the claim that the 
dominant mode of political competition – programmatic or patronage-oriented – is crucial for the 
eventual age-orientation of social spending. Do the mechanisms we’ve observed at work in these 
cases travel? Cross-sectional comparisons across a wider range of country cases, as in Figure 3, 
are suggestive. Among the twenty OECD countries for which we have reliable data, program struc-
ture and the mode of political competition are perfectly correlated, with the age-orientation of 
social spending showing only a small amount of independent variation.
21 
 
The distinction between occupational and citizenship-based welfare programs alters the 
costs and benefits to politicians of expanding programs in different ways. Program structure also 
affects the salience to the public of different types of benefits, and thus the ability of political 
actors to mobilize voters around the expansion of particular welfare-state programs. The way that 
social programs are structured affects the degree of transparency surrounding political decisions 
about spending, which rewards patronage-oriented and programmatic politicians unevenly. And 
the ability of clientelist politicians to use the welfare state for patronage affects the preferences of 
other political actors in ways that lead to the preservation of occupationalist systems. For all of 
these reasons, the mode of political competition reinforces early choices about the structure of 
welfare programs, and thus the eventual age-orientation of welfare states. Joining this intuition to 
our understanding of how different program structures mature over time to produce different age-
orientations, it becomes possible to visualize, as in Figure 1, a tree-like set of branching pathways 
by which specific age-orientations in social policy emerge. 
 
Two critical junctures in welfare-state formation condition the eventual age-orientation of 
social policies. The first critical juncture, the split in the early twentieth century between occupa-
tional and citizenship-based regimes, creates divergent age-orientations as welfare programs ma-
ture: occupational regimes become elderly-oriented, while citizenship-based ones are more neu-
tral with respect to age. The second critical juncture occurs around World War II, when some oc-
cupational countries reduce the elderly-orientation of their welfare spending by becoming mixed 
systems, adding universal programs to their base of occupational programs. Others remain pure 
occupational systems, and continue to develop highly elderly-oriented spending patterns. This 
                                                 
20Except where otherwise noted, all figures in this paragraph are author's calculations from Wave V Lux-
embourg Income Study Data. Poverty line is 50 percent of median income. Unfortunately it is not possible 
to compare the poverty or inequality reduction carried out by taxes and transfers in the two countries be-
cause Italy does not report pre-tax income (for reasons that are clear from the preceding discussion).  
21Belgium constitutes the main challenges to the model, with quite youth-oriented social policies in the 
context of an occupational welfare state and clearly patronage-oriented political system. This anomaly can 
be explained almost entirely by very high family allowance spending that is maintained throughout the 
post-World War II period, rather than declining as in Italy and, to a lesser extent, in France. These con-
tinuing high levels of family allowance benefits seem to be maintained by pressure from vibrant large-
family interest groups and unions with a stake in the administration of family allowance programs. See 
Aldous et al. (1980), Morgan (2001).  
 
second divide is both facilitated and reinforced by the mode of political competition, program-
matic or patronage-oriented, that prevails in these countries.  
 
In countries where many politicians competed for votes using patronage, fragmented oc-
cupational program structures provided critical resources for politicians, and were thus never 
abolished. At the same time, the attachment of politicians to particularistic systems of taxation, 
ways of financing social security, and kinds of labor-market regulation made universalistic social 
programs unpalatable even for Leftist politicians, who were for ideological reasons less inclined 
to compete along particularistic lines. In countries where political competition occurred along pri-
marily programmatic lines, it was easier to introduce citizenship-based programs because politi-
cians were less tempted to undermine tax systems in order to reward self-employed voters. They 
were also less tempted to tailor existing fragmented occupational social programs to appeal to 
micro-clienteles, and thus less devoted to the preservation of occupational program structures.  
 
The original choice to organize social programs along either citizenship-based or occupa-
tional lines had a lasting influence on the age-orientation of social policies today in a wide range 
of industrialized countries. But this choice was not necessarily a permanent one. At key moments 
such institutional choices need to be reaffirmed. In the welfare states of Europe, North America 
and the Pacific, the predominant mode of political competition in the period following the Second 
World War served as the backdrop against which institutional structures were either reaffirmed or 
renegotiated. The mode of political competition, either programmatic or particularist, thus has im-
portant consequences for the age-orientation of social spending, channeling as it does the choices 
politicians make about how to structure and distribute social welfare benefits. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The argument presented here highlights two features of welfare states that have until now 
received very little attention in the literature on comparative social policy: the structure of 
welfare-state programs, and the use that politicians make of such programs in their competitive 
battles with one another. With this new analytical leverage, we can reconsider some of the classic 
explanatory paradigms that have been offered to explain why welfare states in highly industrial-
ized countries vary on a variety of dimensions. 
 
The explanation for why welfare states differ in their age-orientation is perhaps most sur-
prising because it has so little to do with the politics of age. The political power of age-based 
political actors and the ideologies they are presumed to carry with them about what is a just dis-
tribution across the life-course play far less of a role in determining the age of welfare than ex-
pected. This suggests two important lessons. First, a demand-driven explanation for the age-
orientation of social policies is not satisfying. The age-orientation of the welfare state cannot be 
read simply as the revealed preference of powerful demographic groups. Politicians help invent 
the demand for such welfare-state policies as family allowances, unemployment benefits, and old-
age pensions, as surely as they provide for the supply of these welfare goods.  
 
Second, the unintended consequences of institutional rigidities probably play a larger role 
in structuring welfare-state outcomes than much of the previous literature recognizes. Policy 
“drift” allows old institutions and structures to generate new outcomes as the context within 
which they operate changes (see Hacker forthcoming). The age-orientation of welfare states is an 
outgrowth of early choices about welfare-state structures, choices that were made without con-
cern for the shape of the labor market, public finance, family structures, or demographic trends 
one hundred years hence. It seems likely that other attributes of welfare states that are also af-
fected by the institutional form of social policies – attributes like aggregate social spending or the  
 
extent to which welfare states “decommodify” workers – may also rely more than previously 
recognized on the unintended consequences of earlier policy decisions.  
 
If this is true, then neither the age-orientation of welfare states nor some of these other 
characteristics of welfare states that interest scholars should be interpreted purely as offshoots of 
the standard configurations of ideological or power-resources variables (Left and/or Christian 
Democratic power, more or less redistributive ideologies). To focus on preexisting institutions 
and on the prevailing political rules of the game forces us to consider the resources that specific 
contexts of competition confer on (or deny to) politicians, as well as these actors’ ideologies and 
goals. Even when politicians are ideologically committed to particular policy goals, they may 
eventually press for other, sub-optimal policy solutions. Left-leaning political actors in Italy, for 
example, repeatedly chose not to pursue the generous universal social benefits that they had once 
advocated because the political strategies of Center and Right politicians made other, second-best 
solutions preferable. This is not to deny the importance of power resources, or of purposive action 
on the part of politicians and other policymakers – both of which have undeniably contributed to 
the shape of welfare states as we know them today, not least through the initial choice of occupa-
tional or citizenship-based program designs. But all politicians must do their work within specific 
contexts, only some of which permit them to choose policies that are optimal from the standpoint 
of their ideological or organizational commitments. 
 
This finding illuminates an important but often overlooked characteristic of the roughly 
one-half of polities in the advanced industrialized countries where programmatic political compe-
tition is not the norm. Patronage-based political competition, even when it is the preferred style of 
a minority of politicians, sends out ripples that affect the entire polity. This is because particular-
istic behavior on the part of ruling politicians informs not only their own strategies, but also the 
strategies and even policy preferences of opposition politicians. The clearest example from this 
work is the clientelist manipulation of the tax system in Italy, which contributed to Left politi-
cians’ and unions leaders’ decision to abandon the project of building a universalistic welfare 
state.  
 
The results of particularistic political competition for the capacity of welfare states to per-
form arguably their most important function – caring for vulnerable outsiders – are pernicious. In 
this account, the quality of political life emerges as key determinant of the quality of social bene-
fits, echoing T. H. Marshall’s (1950) linkage of political and social citizenship. Where program-
matic party competition prevails, new social programs can come forward to meet the emerging 
social needs of adults and children struggling to balance work and caring responsibilities in a 
changing labor market – and can constrain the otherwise powerful budgetary expansionism of 
social benefits for protected core workers and pensioners. In settings where patronage prevails, 
however, benefits are concentrated on a relatively small group of privileged, aging insiders, while 
the growing mass of outsiders is left to fend for itself.   
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